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LEAVING DISESTABLISHMENT TO
THE POLITICAL PROCESS
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND
INTRODUCTION
1

Last term, the Supreme Court decided Greece v. Galloway, a case
about prayer at town meetings. The Court upheld the prayer scheme,
which is what most expected. There were no big surprises, no sea
change in the law. The Supreme Court made it somewhat more
difficult for plaintiffs to challenge legislative prayers, though the door
remains open, if just a crack.
If Galloway is important, it is not for what it holds but for what it
signals about the future of the Establishment Clause. Academics are
prone to overreading cases—seeing portentous omens where others
see only dirty tea leaves. But let me play the role of provocateur. Let
me suggest that Galloway does have a message and that message is
this: The Establishment Clause is pretty much done.
This sounds annoyingly overwrought, so let me clarify a bit. It is
not that the Establishment Clause no longer means anything—or
even that the Roberts Court will cut the Establishment Clause back
2
significantly. Despite repeated invitations and concrete opportunities,
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Forward, SCOTUSBLOG (May 6, 2014, 5:05PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/
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Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134
S Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5461834.
1. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
2. Contra, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1,
49 (2007) (“If the assumptions outlined here about the new majority of the Roberts Court are
correct, we are about to witness a paradigm shift in the way the Supreme Court approaches the
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the Court has refused to make sweeping changes to the Establishment
Clause. Of course, the future will surely see changes. Now that Justice
Kennedy has replaced Justice O’Connor as the swing vote, the Court
will probably be more accepting of government-sponsored religious
3
symbols and evenhanded funding of religious institutions. But the
middle of the Court seems profoundly uninterested in a general
rollback of the Establishment Clause. The bar on governmentsponsored religion in public schools will remain more-or-less absolute.
And outside public schools, the Court will continue to restrict
government-sponsored religion to a few discrete areas and regulate it
pretty heavily within those areas. The Establishment Clause is safe, at
least for the most part. So when I suggest that the Establishment
Clause is pretty much done, I mean something different.
I
The Establishment Clause is a constitutional provision with a
teleology. Its natural ambition, its built-in goal, is the end we
conveniently call disestablishment—the abolition of all the religious
preferences associated with the old established churches of Western
4
Europe. But disestablishment is more of a process than an object.
Disestablishment did not happen in 1689 with Locke’s Letter
5
Concerning Toleration; it did not happen in 1789 with the passage of
the First Amendment; it did not happen in 1833 when Massachusetts
abandoned the final vestiges of its formally established church; it did
not happen in 1868 with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment; it
6
7
did not happen in 1947 with Everson, or in 1962 with Engel. Those
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”).
3. Most vulnerable are (1) the restraints on direct funding imposed by Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000), where Justice Kennedy did not join Justice O’Connor’s limiting
concurrence, and (2) the restraints on religious symbols established in McCreary County v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), which were supported by Justice O’Connor but not by Justice
Kennedy.
4. This statement is not uncontroversial; it requires a defense against those who would
argue that the Establishment Clause is neutral on disestablishment, in the sense that it left intact
establishments of religion created by state governments. See STEVE D. SMITH, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 49–62 (2014); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,
693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). It is true, of course, that the Establishment Clause left state
establishments alone, but that is not at all the same as being neutral on disestablishment. For a
longer explanation of this point, see Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 155, 241–43 (2004).
5. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Hacket Publishing Co. 1983)
(1689).
6. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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things advanced the cause of disestablishment but did not accomplish
it. For there were many elements to an established church, and those
8
elements had to be removed one by one. Disestablishment has taken
centuries. But it would be better to say that disestablishment is taking
centuries. We are not done yet.
The principal driver of disestablishment has always been religious
diversity. As religious diversity grows, so too does the thirst for
disestablishment. As the range of religious disagreement expands,
things formerly agreed upon lose their consensus. The Elizabethan
Settlement saw the Anglican Church try, sometimes genuinely, to
tolerate within itself the entire range of then-existing religious
opinion. But the Puritans in seventeenth-century England were just
too disagreeable, as were the Baptists and Presbyterians in
eighteenth-century Virginia. The battles they engendered brought the
most obvious and restrictive features of the classic establishments—
tax support and mandatory attendance—to a close.
This still held out the possibility of a pan-Protestant alliance,
organized around the government still being able to teach religious
truth; the early-19th-century public schools taught a watered-down
kind of generic Protestantism that had wide-ranging appeal. But
newly arriving Catholic immigrants struggled against this, and the
resulting controversies dashed hopes that government could instill
Christianity without controversy. And this century has brought our
country only further down this road. Increasing religious diversity has
frustrated every attempt to close ranks. Even if Protestants and
Catholics could agree on daily school readings from the New
Testament, what about Jews? Even if all of them could agree on Ten
Commandments displays, what about Hindus, Buddhists, and
nonbelievers?
For most of American history, the Supreme Court had no role in
any of these developments. The Court did not regularly start hearing

7. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
8. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding,
Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131–81 (2003) (noting the
central elements of the established Anglican church in England were (1) government control
over the doctrines, structure, and personnel of the state church; (2) mandatory attendance at the
religious worship services of the state church; (3) public financial support of the state church; (4)
prohibition of religious worship in other denominations; (5) the use of the state church for civil
functions, such as marriage; and (6) the limitation of political participation to members of the
state church).

LUND 4.1.15-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

48

6/24/2015 5:22 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 10:1

9

Establishment Clause cases until 1947. But over the past seventy
years, the Court has become the principal expositor and enforcer of
the Establishment Clause. And while there have been periods of
decline and periods of vacillation, the long arc of judicial intervention
has bent toward greater and greater disestablishment.
And at least for some, this gave rise to a set of largely unstated
expectations. The
Court
might
resist
temporarily, but
disestablishment’s natural gravity would ultimately prove inexorable.
The Court would bring the Establishment Clause to its completion; it
would write the final chapter of disestablishment. It would overrule
the decisions allowing holiday displays and Ten Commandments
displays; it would invalidate the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance and maybe even “In God We Trust” on the currency; it
would overrule its decision sanctioning legislative prayer. This might
take decades; it might take more. And last of all the cases to be
overruled would be the Court’s 1961 decision in McGowan v.
10
Maryland, the Sunday-closing-law case. Five centuries after Luther
and three centuries after Locke, Pennsylvanians would finally be free
11
to hunt on Sundays.
But that is not the future of the Establishment Clause. We do not
know what that future will be exactly, but it will not be that. A bit
depends, of course, on the future composition of the Court. But even
deep changes in the Court’s personnel will not change the basic point.
Thirty years ago, there were three votes to overrule Marsh v.
12
13
Chambers. Now there are none. Strict separationists have always
had trouble counting to five; now we have trouble counting to one.
The meaning of old cases will change and new developments will
generate new cases. But there is a feeling now unlike before—a
feeling that we stand at the end of the Establishment Clause. The
Court will not take us much further along this path. Perhaps, oddly
enough, this too is a consequence of America’s increasing religious

9. See supra text accompanying note 6 (citing Everson).
10. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
11. See Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 28 F. Supp. 3d 340, 340
(M.D. Pa. 2014) (upholding, under Establishment Clause challenge, Section 2303(a) of the
Pennsylvania Game and Wildlife Code, which makes it “unlawful for any person to hunt for any
furbearer or game on Sunday”).
12. 463 U.S. 783, 795–822 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at
822–24 (Stevens., J., dissenting).
13. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kagan’s agreement with
Marsh).
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pluralism. Perhaps the Court thinks nonbelievers are now sufficiently
numerous and powerful to protect themselves. There is truth to that.
But there is another side too—America is religiously heterogeneous
at the national level, but is often quite homogenous at the local level.
There are dangers with leaving disestablishment to the political
process.
II
To understand Galloway, it helps to begin not with its facts but
14
with the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Marsh v. Chambers.
Marsh involved a challenge to Nebraska’s practice of having a
15
permanent chaplain open legislative sessions with prayer. The
challenge was not far-fetched. The Court had interpreted the
Establishment Clause to prohibit government from favoring religion
for decades, and legislative chaplaincies seemed a clear violation of
16
that principle. But in a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court
upheld Nebraska’s practice, making a small but important exception
to its stated rule of religious neutrality. This exception, the Court
17
explained, was just so clearly implied by history. The First Congress
18
approved the Establishment Clause, but it also hired chaplains.
While Marsh accepted legislative prayer, it also suggested limits.
In one part of the opinion, the Court said that legislative prayer could
not be “exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage
19
any other, faith or belief.” In another, the Court approvingly noted
how Nebraska’s chaplain had stopped using specifically Christian
20
language in his prayers after a complaint. So Marsh seemed to
impose a limit on prayers—they could not be too denominational—
but the Court never explained exactly where the line should be
drawn.
In the thirty years after Marsh, lower courts looked for that line in
a variety of cases presenting all kinds of facts. Galloway turned out to
be the one the Supreme Court took. Not all the facts in Galloway
14. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
15. Id. at 784.
16. Id. at 796–98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 786 (majority opinion).
18. For an extended look at Marsh and for detail on these points, see Christopher C. Lund,
Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 980–90
(2010).
19. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95.
20. Id. at 793 n.14.
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were agreed upon, but the general outline is clear. Located in upstate
New York, the Town of Greece began inviting local clergy to offer
21
prayers before meetings starting in 1999. Until 2007, all the clergy
were Christian ministers and their prayers frequently referred to
22
Jesus Christ and frequently encouraged the audience to join in. After
complaints, the prayer-givers became more diverse—a Wiccan
priestess gave a prayer, as did the head of a Bah’ai congregation and a
23
Jewish layperson. The Town even said that atheists and agnostics
could sign up to give invocations, though it did not publicize that
24
fact. But the vast majority of prayers involved Christian language.
And after 2009, for reasons that are not entirely clear, only Christian
25
clergy were involved in offering prayers.
Both sides brought straightforward arguments. The plaintiffs saw
this arrangement as overly coercive and unduly sectarian. The Town
was not just supporting religion in general but Christianity in
particular, and attendees were forced either into praying or appearing
26
to pray. The Town said this was unfortunate but inevitable. In a town
made up mostly of Christians, most prayers inevitably would be
27
Christian, unless the government started acting as a kind of censor.
Earlier work of mine has stressed how both sides are
fundamentally right, and how legislative prayer ends up being a kind
28
of zero-sum game for religious liberty. Listeners deserve to be
protected from their government making religious statements with
which they disagree. But protecting them requires speakers to change
the ways they pray. It is a classic catch-22, rooted in a simple
undeniable fact: We live in a world where people have different
religious beliefs. Some do not pray. And those who do pray do so in
different ways; they pray to Gods that they do not see as the same
God. In that world, there is no way for the government to pray in a
way that satisfies everyone. This has always been a central problem
with the government practicing religion: Whose religion will it
21. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816 (2014).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1817.
24. Id. at 1816.
25. The Court explores the facts in Galloway. Id. at 1816–18. Additional details can be
found in Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer Goes Back to the Supreme Court, SLATE, Aug.
15, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/the_supreme_
court_will_have_another_chance_to_decide_when_government_can.html.
26. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 at 1819–20.
27. Id. at 1814, 1817.
28. See Lund, supra note 18, at 1029–30.
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practice?
This has led to some difficult choices for local governments who
choose to have legislative prayer. Recent history provides cases of
excluded speakers, alienated listeners, interrupting protestors
(sometimes sent to prison), censorship and editorial control, inflamed
29
citizenry, retaliation, and political spillover. In one under-the-radar
example that developed at the same time as Galloway, a referendum
put it to the voters to decide whether the City Council should
continue its policy allowing prayers mentioning Jesus Christ. Twelve
thousand votes were cast—76 percent in favor of allowing references
30
to Christ, 24 percent opposed. Maybe we accept these kinds of
developments as inevitable consequences of legislative prayer’s
sometimes positive role in the history of this country, but these are
some uncomfortable things we have to accept.
III
Galloway is not a terribly surprising decision. Most expected the
Court to uphold the prayer scheme. The Second Circuit’s judgment
seemed vulnerable from the moment it was issued. The die was
probably cast when certiorari was granted, or at least when the
Obama Administration entered the case on the Town’s side.
And Galloway is not terribly groundbreaking either. The Court
makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to challenge legislative prayer
schemes, but it works strenuously to limit the consequences of its
decision. Justice Kennedy writes the majority opinion for five Justices.
He concludes that the prayers are constitutional, because they are
31
neither overly sectarian nor overly coercive. It is enough that the
Town opened the prayer opportunity up to all denominations, and
allowed anyone to say anything. It does not matter that prayers ended
up overwhelmingly Christian—that was not the Town’s fault. It does
not matter that attendees may have felt pressured to join the
prayers—they had no objective reason to feel pressured. This holding
is not shocking. It is, in fact, pretty much what the Obama
29. These examples are discussed in Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 18–24, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013
WL 5461834 at *18–24; and Lund, supra note 18, at 1039–49 (2010).
30. See Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (upholding
the policy and practice), aff'd, 710 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2013). But see W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections.”).
31. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1828.
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Administration had urged, and what some lower courts had held
before Galloway.
Now the Court leaves the door open. The Justices repeatedly
caution that some prayer schemes might cross the constitutional line.
But the Court clearly means to make it more difficult to bring these
cases. Marsh had said that legislative prayers could not “proselytize or
32
advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.” Consider
the differences between that and the majority opinion in Galloway:
“[T]he course and practice over time [must show] that the invocations
denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or
33
preach conversion.” Notice the subtle changes there—the addition
of the phrases “course and practice” and “over time,” the use of words
like “denigration” instead of “disparagement,” “damnation” instead of
“advancement,” “preaching conversion” instead of “proselytizing.”
While the Court is clear about its desire to raise the bar, it is
profoundly unclear on where exactly it means to set it. The Court
offers a multitude of vague and slightly inconsistent phrases. As per
above, the Court condemns invocation practices that “denigrate
nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach
34
conversion.” But at another point, the Court says that the issue is
whether there is “a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate,
35
proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose.” Is
there a difference there? Later on, the Court says there would also be
a problem “if town board members directed the public to participate
in the prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that
their decisions might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the
36
prayer opportunity.” But then, sentences later, the Court rephrases
the same concerns in a slightly different way, asking whether the
government “allocated benefits and burdens based on participation in
the prayer,” “received [citizens] differently depending on whether
they joined the invocation,” “signal[ed] disfavor toward
nonparticipants,” or “suggest[ed] that their stature in the community
37
was in any way diminished” by not participating. There certainly is a
common core here, but it’s not clear which of the things (if any) is

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983).
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1823.
Id.
Id. at 1824.
Id. at 1826.
Id.
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supposed to be the touchstone. All the Court will say is that each is a
38
“fact-sensitive” inquiry.
The predictable result is that no one has any idea where the line is.
And this may be an intended result too. The Court wants to set the
bar high enough to discourage plaintiffs from bringing these suits, but
the absence of any bar whatsoever would only encourage abuses by
defendants. When the goal is to paralyze both sides, it is best to have
an unclear test. The Court knows this from experience. This is
precisely what the Court did in its cases about holiday displays and
39
Ten Commandments monuments.
One intriguing aspect to the decision is the way the Court handles
the issue of state action. The best single fact for the Town—a fact that
they smartly stressed at every critical juncture—was how prayergivers were selected. It looked almost like a public forum. The Town
did not pick and choose among clergy, so the fact that the prayers
happened to be overwhelmingly Christian came as a natural
consequence of the Town’s religious demographics. Preventing overly
denominational prayers, the Town stressed, would mean either
manipulating the clergy-selection process or censoring prayers.
The claim of censorship takes beautiful advantage of the blur that
sometimes exists between private and state action. At bottom, no one
really doubts that Greece is responsible for these prayers. (That is, of
course, why the Establishment Clause applies here in the first place.)
So there is state action. But the state action is quite dim; the prayers
have private aspects too. This both gives respectability to the claim of
censorship and muddies the waters conceptually. The Town is involved
enough that ordinary folks attending meetings will know that the
government stands behind these prayers, but the Town stays out of it
enough to provide plausible deniability of that fact.
This sounds like a novel feature of Galloway, but it is actually a
recurring feature of modern Establishment Clause cases. Think of the
40
cross in Salazar v. Buono, which was on government property but
had been erected by (and later was transferred to) private parties;
38. Id. at 1825 (“The inquiry remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in
which the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”).
39. Ten years ago, the Court decided two cases involving Ten Commandments displays,
upholding one and striking down the other. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844
(2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). Twenty years earlier, the Court was similarly
divided in two cases involving holiday displays. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
40. 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
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think of the student election in Santa Fe Independent School District v.
41
42
Doe, or the invited rabbi in Lee v. Weisman. Government masks its
role enough that courts instinctively think of the religious activity as
private and any interference as entanglement and censorship. But out
of court, government can let the mask drop. One sees this in Galloway
itself. The Court is obviously troubled by the censorial implications of
43
the plaintiff’s argument. But now that state and local governments
have their holding on the Establishment Clause issue, they can freely
go back to policies where the state action is more pronounced. Now
largely freed of content restrictions, local officials can simply pray
themselves and forget about inviting in outside clergy or residents.
44
This may be happening already.
Another striking part of Galloway is the Court’s rhetoric. There is
a bit of irony here. Over the years, when the left was winning these
cases, liberal Justices would be attacked by conservatives for being far
too confident in their judgments about what endorses religion, how
45
alienated people feel because of endorsements of religion, and so on.
The Court’s opinion here is equally confident, though just on the
other side. Here’s the majority opinion on the issue of whether the
prayers coerce nonbelievers into participating:
It is presumed that the reasonable observer is acquainted with this
[historical] tradition [behind legislative prayer] and understands
that its purposes are to lend gravity to public proceedings and to
acknowledge the place religion holds in the lives of many private
citizens, not to afford government an opportunity to proselytize or

41. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
42. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). For more examples of cases blurring the lines between private and
state action, see Christopher C. Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Establishment
Clause, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1387, 1393–94 & nn.31–38 (2011).
43. Justice Kennedy repeatedly says that censorship is not constitutionally required. But at
one point, he goes further and implies that censorship is actually forbidden: “Once it invites
prayer into the public sphere, government must permit a prayer giver to address his or her own
God or gods as conscience dictates, unfettered by what an administrator or judge considers to
be nonsectarian.” Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1822–23. The word “must” in that sentence jumps off
the page, although the Court surely does not mean all that it would imply.
44. See John Ramsey, Board Changes Prayer Policy, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (VA),
July 24, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 20216299 (noting how the county used to allow clergy
from monotheistic denominations, but now “[i]nstead of swinging open the doors to people of
all faiths, the county instead will experiment with allowing only supervisors to open meetings
with a prayer or moment of silence”).
45. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668–79 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 291–95, 309–13 (1987).
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In other words, you may feel coerced by the fact that the people
with the legal power to approve your zoning variance are watching
you pray from thirty feet away, but you are acting unreasonably
because no reasonable person would feel that way. Or take this one:
Should nonbelievers choose to exit the room during a prayer they
find distasteful, their absence will not stand out as disrespectful or
even noteworthy. And their quiet acquiescence will not, in light of
our traditions, be interpreted as an agreement with the words or
47
ideas expressed.

But the Court cannot hope to control social conventions this way!
Nonbelievers feel the way they feel; their actions will be interpreted
as they will by the other people in the room. No one’s sentiments will
be controlled by the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
All of these points matter, but they matter much less if Galloway’s
import is restricted to legislative prayer. This raises the question: What
importance does Galloway have for the larger Establishment Clause?
Since Marsh, the shared understanding has been that whatever the
Court does with legislative prayer has basically no relevance to other
48
Establishment Clause issues. Galloway tries to push against that.
Justice Kennedy says legislative prayer can no longer be treated as a
49
kind of historical carve-out. This suggests Establishment Clause
jurisprudence will have to be overhauled so as to square it with the
50
Framers’ approval of congressional chaplaincies. But at the same
time, Justice Kennedy’s opinion goes to great lengths to not address
any topic other than legislative prayer—the Court delicately avoids
saying anything that would create ripple effects on the Court’s
approach to school prayer, symbols, or financial aid to religion.
So Justice Kennedy says that Marsh cannot be treated as a carveout, even as he continues to treat Marsh as a carve-out. But he is right
not to take his own advice. For whatever principle the Court ends up
adopting as its general approach to the Establishment Clause, Marsh
46. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1825.
47. Id. at 1827.
48. See Lund, supra note 18, at 1049–50.
49. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (“Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice
that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation.”).
50. Justice Kennedy says this directly at one point: “Any test the Court adopts must
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny
of time and political change.” Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
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by necessity will continue to be treated as a carve-out. The Court’s
problem with legislative prayer always comes back to this: There are
many possible principled versions of the Establishment Clause, but
the congressional chaplaincies are inconsistent with every single one.
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, for instance, conceive of the
Establishment Clause quite narrowly. In a separate opinion in
Galloway, they reiterate their longstanding view that the
51
Establishment Clause applies only in cases of “actual legal coercion.”
But the congressional chaplaincies are actually legally coercive!
Congress’s chaplaincies are paid by taxes, and everyone agrees taxes
are coercive. The majority’s opinion recognizes the problem; its only
response is that “the cost of [a congressional] chaplain’s salary
52
imposed a vanishingly small burden on taxpayers.” But what does
that mean? A small enough tax doesn’t trigger the Establishment
53
Clause? The $500 salary for a congressional chaplain in 1789
translates to about $13,000 in today’s dollars. There were 3 million
people in the country in 1789, and around 300 million people today.
So this is very rough, but a government expenditure of $1.3 million
today would have the same order of effect as the 1789 Congress’s
expenditure of chaplain funds. Could Virginia pass a Bill Establishing
a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, as long as the
government expenditure is less than a million dollars?
This is all silly, of course; none of this will happen. But the reason
why none of this will happen is that the Court will continue to treat
the congressional chaplaincies as sui generis. Knowing that it cannot
succeed, the Court will not try very hard to square legislative prayer
with the rest of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Galloway demonstrates that little has changed on the conservative
side of the Court. The greater change is on the liberal side. Justice
Kagan’s dissent eloquently advances the interrelated values of
pluralism and inclusion in arguing against the constitutionality of the
Town’s policy. But the most striking part of her dissent is what it does

51. “[I]t is actual legal coercion that counts,” including “coercion of religious orthodoxy
and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.” Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1837–38
(Thomas, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 1819 (majority opinion).
53. On the other hand, there is Madison: “[T]he same authority which can force a citizen
to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.” James Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 82, 82 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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not say. Thirty years ago, three Justices would have declared the
54
practice of legislative prayer unconstitutional tout court. No one on
the current Court feels that way. Not only would the dissenters not
overrule Marsh, Justice Kagan goes out of her way to say that she
55
agrees with it. Sixty years ago, in a case almost no one now
remembers, Justice Douglas made this statement: “We are a religious
56
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” Justice
Kagan’s dissent quotes this line approvingly—although she shrewdly
57
leaves off the “institutions presuppose a Supreme Being” part of it.
Of all the lines in Galloway, that was perhaps the most surprising. It
suggests that even the liberal Justices are mostly content with the
present boundaries of the Establishment Clause, and are willing to
leave further changes to the political process. But how that will go,
and what it will mean, are questions only the future can answer.

54. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795–822 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined
by Marshall, J.); id. at 822–24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1841–42 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court’s
decision in Marsh . . . upholding the Nebraska Legislature’s tradition of beginning each session
with a chaplain’s prayer.” (citation omitted)).
56. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
57. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1850 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

